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Networks with Renewable Energy Powered Base
Stations
Dapeng Li, Walid Saad, Ismail Guvenc, Abolfazl Mehbodniya, and Fumiyuki Adachi
Abstract—In this paper, a green wireless communication
system in which base stations are powered by renewable en-
ergy sources is considered. This system consists of a capacity-
constrained renewable power supplier (RPS) and a base station
(BS) that faces a predictable random connection demand from
mobile user equipments (UEs). In this model, the BS powered via
a combination of a renewable power source and the conventional
electric grid, seeks to specify the renewable power inventory
policy, i.e., the power storage level. On the other hand, the RPS
must strategically choose the energy amount that is supplied to
the BS. An M/M/1 make-to-stock queuing model is proposed
to investigate the decentralized decisions when the two parties
optimize their individual costs in a noncooperative manner. The
problem is formulated as a noncooperative game whose Nash
equilibrium (NE) strategies are characterized in order to identify
the causes of inefficiency in the decentralized operation. A set of
simple linear contracts are introduced to coordinate the system
so as to achieve an optimal system performance. The proposed
approach is then extended to a setting with one monopolistic RPS
and N BSs that are privately informed of their optimal energy
inventory levels. In this scenario, we show that the widely-used
proportional allocation mechanism is no longer socially optimal.
In order to make the BSs truthfully report their energy demand,
an incentive compatible (IC) mechanism is proposed for our
model. Simulation results show that using the green energy can
present significant traditional energy savings for the BS when the
connection demand is not heavy. Moreover, the proposed scheme
provides valuable energy cost savings by allowing the BSs to
smartly use a combination of renewable and traditional energy,
even when the BS has a heavy traffic of connections. Also, the
results show that performance of the proposed IC mechanism will
be close to the social optimal, when the green energy production
capacity increases.
Index Terms—Green communications, renewable power sup-
ply, game theory, contract, mechanism design.
I. INTRODUCTION
ENergy efficiency has recently emerged as a major re-search challenge in the next generation of wireless sys-
tems [1] in order to reduce the carbon footprint and CO2
emission of wireless networks. The electric bill has become
a significant portion of the operational expenditure of cellular
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operators, and the CO2 emission produced by wireless cellular
networks are equivalent to those from more than 8 million cars
[2]. The largest fraction of power consumption in wireless
networks comes from base stations (BSs), especially, when
they are deployed in large numbers [3]. With this premise,
power saving in BSs is particularly important for network
operators. In order to reduce the energy consumption of the
BS, an online algorithm is used to enable BSs to switch
between on/off states according to traffic characteristics [4].
At the same time, the role of renewable energy generation
will be a promising energy alternative for future mobile
networks. Understanding the interaction between the random
green power generations and the dynamics of the energy
consumption on wireless networks becomes a main challenge
facing future green communications design.
Manufacturers and network operators such as Ericsson,
Huawei, Vodafone and China Mobile have started developing
the BS with a renewable power source [5]–[7]. Relating to to
the operation of modern radio and data center networks, the
concepts such as demand response, supply load control, and
the model of the prosumer in the smart grid are explored in [8].
However, solar energy and wind energy are not controllable
generation resources like traditional generation resources such
as coal or natural gas. These resources are intermittent and
can have a random output. It is, hence, both desirable and
challenging to design and optimize the green energy enabled
mobile networks. The recent work in [9] lays out basic
design principles and research challenges on optimizing the
green energy powered mobile networks, and points out that
green energy powered BSs should be properly designed and
optimized to cope with the dynamics of green power and
mobile data traffic.
Considering the use of renewable energy sources, the au-
thors in [10] study throughput and value based wireless trans-
mission scheduling under time limits and energy constraints
for wireless network. The BSs’ transmission strategies that can
be optimized to reduce the energy demands without degrading
the quality of service of the network are investigated in [11].
The authors in [12] propose a packet scheduling algorithm
shaping the BS’s energy demands to match the green power
generation. In order to sustain traffic demand of all users,
green energy utilization is optimized by balancing the traffic
loads among the BSs [13]. The green energy source aware
user association schemes are examined in [14]. These research
attempts mainly focus on adapting BSs’ transmission strategies
by using the green energy sources. However, most of these
works do not account for energy storage nor do they investigate
prospective energy storage strategies.
2Since mobile traffic shows temporal dynamics, a BS’s
energy demands change over time. Instead of focusing on
specific techniques, the authors in [9] provide guidelines
showing that BSs could determine how much energy is utilized
at the current stage and how much energy is reserved for
the future. The authors in [15] propose to reduce the BS’s
power consumption at certain stages and reserve energy for
the future to satisfy the network’s outage constraint. The recent
work in [16] provides a stochastic programming formulation to
minimize the BS’s energy storage cost (i.e., the battery self-
discharge cost) and the cost of using the renewable energy
and electric energy. However, there are many issues that
these works do not tackle and remain to be addressed. For
instance, the renewable source and the BS generally belong to
different operators. As a result, to deploy renewable-powered
BSs, it is important to understand the interaction/competition
between the renewable energy supplier and the BS, especially
considering the competition’s impact on the QoS.
The main contribution of this paper is to propose a novel
noncooperative game model to investigate the optimized en-
ergy allocation strategies of the renewable power supplier
(RPS) and the BS. On the one hand, the RPS incurs supply cost
and the possible QoS performance reducing cost. On the other
hand, the BS incurs energy reservation cost and also the QoS
cost. They will unilaterally choose their supply and reservation
strategies, respectively, to minimize their individual cost.We
formulate the problem as a noncooperative game between the
RPS and the BS.
To solve the studied game, we propose an M/M/1 make-
to-stock queue model to analyze the competitive behavior
between the RPS and the BS. Different from the traditional
queue, the make-to-stock queue has a buffer of resource laying
in between the end user and the server. In our queue model, the
RPS can be viewed as a server. The order for energy storage
replenishment from the BS will be placed to the RPS server.
We explicitly characterize the NE strategies and present a set
of simple linear contracts to coordinate the system to optimize
the overall network performance and achieve an efficient point,
under a decentralized design. We then extend the result to
a setting with one monopolistic limited capacity RPS and
N BSs. BSs are privately informed of their optimal energy
inventory levels. If the energy orders of a given BS exceed
the available capacity, the RPS allocates capacity using a
publicly known allocation mechanism, i.e., a mapping from
BS orders to capacity assignments. Based on our model, an
incentive compatible mechanism that induces BSs truthfully
report their energy demands is proposed. In summary, we make
the following contributions,
• We analyze the decentralized energy allocation optimiza-
tion for wireless networks with green the energy powered
BS. Using an M/M/1 make-to-stock queue model, we
investigate how the supply rate of RPS and the energy
storage/inventory level affect the QoS.
• We then model and analyze the interactions between the
RPS and a BS by using a noncooperative game. We prove
the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium, and show
how various system parameters (i.e., the QoS reducing
cost and the cost splitting factor) affect the equilibrium
behavior.
• Based on the NE solution, we investigate how the BS
controls the use of the combination of renewable energy
and the traditional energy. We then explore the centralized
optimal system performance and propose a set of simple
linear contracts to overcome the inefficiency of the NE.
• We study the energy allocation mechanism design for a
system in which a limited capacity monopolistic RPS
provides energy to multiple BSs. We propose a truth-
inducing mechanism where BSs truthfully report their
optimal energy demand is a dominant equilibrium.
To the best of our knowledge, little work has been done
for developping decentralized algorithms that allow to capture
the renewable energy allocation strategies, particularly when
multiple BSs operate. One interesting open problem is to study
how the predictable traffics affect the BSs’ adaptive energy
management strategies and how the network performance is
affected by forecast renewable production capacity, as done in
this paper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The system
model and the noncooperative game formulation are presented
in Section II. In Section III, we analyze the game and prove the
existence and uniqueness of the NE, and we propose a linear
contract to coordinate the system. Section IV examines the
renewable energy allocation mechanism design for a setting
with one limited capacity RPS and multiple BSs. We provide
numerical results and discussion in Section V. Section VI
concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We start by describing, in detail, the different entities
of the studied system. The description of the competition
for renewable power inventories and power supply capacity
between a BS and the RPS is then presented.
A. System Components
1) Electric grid and renewable power supplier: In our
model, we use the term electric grid to refer to a controllable
generation resource such as coal, natural gas, nuclear, or hydro.
Existing research works, i.e., [9], often make a similar assump-
tion to investigate the energy allocation from the controllable
electric grid or dynamic green energy source for BSs. The
power supplied from the electric grid has a price per unit
of quantity, per unit of time. We assume that in a certain
production period, the supplier output power is a random
variable with mean µ0 (unit of energy per unit of time)1.
From the BS’s perspective, the RPS’s production facility is
modeled as a single-server queue with service times that are
exponentially distributed with rate µ which is referred to as
the renewable energy supply rate. The RPS is responsible for
choosing the parameter µ (µ < µ0), which accounts for the
fact that the RPS has a finite capacity.
1For example, the authors in [17] investigated an approach to estimate the
standard deviation of the change in output of solar energy over some time
interval (such as one minute), using data taken from some time period (such
as one year).
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Fig. 1. The considered system in which the BS can use the controllable
energy from electrical grid and it can reserve unstable renewable energy for
serving UEs.
2) Renewable Energy Powered Base Station: We consider
a single base station part of a wireless system that is used
to provide mobile and wireless access. The energy consump-
tions of the BS include the energy coming from different
components such as power amplifier, signal processing unit,
antenna, and cooling [18]. The static power consumption is
constant when the base station is active and does not have
any radio transmissions. We assume that the static component,
i.e., the power consumption of the rectifiers, is served by the
stationary conventional energy source. For example, the work
in [19] shows that the rectifiers could consume 100 W for
a microcell BS. In contrast, the dynamic power consumption
includes the digital signal processing, the transceiver and the
power amplifier and, thus, it can fluctuate during time due
to variations of the load on the base station. The amount of
power consumption depends on the type of base stations [19].
In this paper, we take a typical microcell base station as an
example and use the data from [16], i.e., the dynamic power
consumption coefficient is 24 W (Joule/s) per connection.
The connection demand of the wireless base station depends
on the usage condition, and can be predicted from the usage
history. Indeed, modeling the arrival of a new wireless call
or message arrivals in packet-data network as a Poisson
arrival process is extensively studied [20]–[22]. Moreover,
research works such as in [23] showed that traffic demands
are highly predictable. Although even for the queuing systems
whose arrival or service rates have general distributions, the
heavy traffic condition will generate mean queue lengths that
coincide with M/M/1 queue results [24].
We model the connection demand as a homogeneous Pois-
son process with rate λ. The incoming connections are as-
sumed to form a single waiting line that depends on the order
of arrival, i.e., the first-come first-served discipline. We assume
that the BS consumes a unit transmission energy, E, for
each connection in the downlink. Each connection generates
a revenue per unit time to the BS.
In order to serve the connections by using the intermittent
renewable energy, the BS should charge the green energy to
an energy storage unit. If the energy storage is less than a
certain level, the BS will replenish the green energy from the
RPS. The BS will pay a price P1 to the RPS for reserving
each unit energy. The BS’s power reservation strategy needs
to be varied dynamically and periodically as renewable pro-
duction condition changes. Hereinafter, we consider one such
production period. Notice for the ideal case that the BS can be
supplied with enough green power, there is no need to analyze
green energy allocation strategies and the QoS cost again.
The BS incurs a reservation cost for holding energy in the
storage unit. Such a reservation cost includes both physical
and financial components. For example, the stored energy
can decrease even without consumption. Such a physical
component is referred to as the self-discharge phenomenon
[16]. On the other hand, the financial holding cost could
be proportional to the energy’s market price, i.e., the BS
can sell the reserved energy to other consumers instead of
holding it in the storage [25]. The future smart grid is able to
integrate and exchange different energy flows among various
users through the on-gird physical and cyber infrastructures
[26]. Particularly, the cyber infrastructure which can perform
energy trading consists of a large number of communication
and computing networks, wide-area monitors, various sensors,
and control functions together with necessary information
processing functions. Thus, the BS or any other users that
are on the grid will have the capability to sell the reserved
energy to other consumers instead of holding it in the storage.
Moreover, some electricity companies have already offered
initial energy buy-back programs [27].
Both the self-discharge cost and the financial holding cost
can be proportional to the average energy reservation level.
As a result, we use the term of c · Is per unit time to
evaluate the energy reservation cost, where Is is the average
energy reservation level and c is the cost coefficient. Note that,
increasing the energy reservation results in less backlogged
connections, but yields a higher reservation cost.
B. Renewable Energy Supply-Inventory Game
When a connection enters the queue of the BS, it will be
provided access to the spectrum only if its energy requirement
amount is available in the storage. The energy consumption
of each connection is one unit, since we assume that each
connection lasts one time unit. If there is not enough energy in
storage, the UE has to wait until the BS reserves sufficient en-
ergy. We say that such a connection experiences a backlogged
access. The BS should make a decision on the desired energy
reservation level s. If the energy storage is less than s units,
the BS will place an order of one unit energy from the RPS2.
Such a decision means that the BS should initially charge the
energy storage to s units. Otherwise when game begins, the
BS will place energy replenishment orders no matter there are
connections arrivals or not. Hence, the energy reservation level
is also referred to as energy inventory strategy.
The service process of a queuing system is characterized
by the distribution of the time serving the arrival of the traffic
pertaining to a given customer. In this regard, the scheduling
process allows one to control the service that is allocated to
the traffic classes [29]. With regards to the RPS, its output is a
random variable and has the capability to generate an average
of µ0 units energy per unit time in a certain time duration. At
the same time, each arriving radio connection will consume
one unit energy. The supply rate µ of the RPS implies that
2 As shown in in [28],the length of charging pulses ranging from millisec-
onds to a second, are scaled to correlate with the electrochemical response
times in the batteries. Also, the charging efficiency which determines the
percent of energy lost during charge achieves to about 90%.
4an average of µ (µ ≤ µ0) units energy can be scheduled to
serve the connections in unit time. Thus, the energy supply
of RPS can be modeled as the service process of a queue.
Moreover, the stock can be introduced to improve the QoS,
i.e., to reduce the average queue length. If multiple connection
requests arrive at the same time, multiple energy orders will be
placed to the RPS at the same time. A standard queue system
will serve the orders according to a First-in-First-out principle.
The value of dynamic energy consumption is related to the
accessed connections. It can be determined by the arriving
accessing requests and the information from the resource
scheduling process. Generally, the radio access request in-
formation is transmitted over the public control channel by
mobile users [30]. Then, at the beginning of each unit time,
the MAC layer of the BS can obtain the instantaneous energy
demand value, and the energy supply requests can be placed
to the RPS accordingly. The key metric for a queuing system
is the stationary average queue length which is directly related
to the total QoS cost. Accordingly, we mainly investigate this
statistical metric instead of using the the instantaneous state
of the queuing system in our model.
If a connection that is at the head of the queue finishes the
access, the on-hand reservation decreases by one. Thus, an
access request is equivalent to an energy reservation request,
and is placed to the RPS at the time instant when a connection
arrives as well, i.e., at each epoch of the demand process. The
backlogged access might generate detrimental consequences
on the system. The QoS will be deteriorated, the UE will
wait and thus will have a higher delay. To model this QoS
degradation, each backlogged access will be assigned a cost
b for the system. This cost is split between the RPS and BS,
with a fraction α ∈ [0, 1] charged to the BS. The parameter α
is exogenously specified in our model. Its value will depend
on a variety of factors, such as the structures of the market
and the UEs’ expectations.
We assume that the system state, the connection demand
rate, and the cost parameters are known by each agent. The BS
and the RPS select the renewable energy base reservation s and
the energy supply rate µ, respectively, in order to maximize
their own profits. The competition between the BS and the
RPS is shown in Fig. 2. Let D define the average number
of backlogged accesses, and Is be the average energy storage
level per unit time. X(µ) represents the operation cost for the
RPS with power supply rate µ. Recall that c is the reservation
cost factor. Then, the average cost per unit time for the BS is
given by:
Co(s, µ) = c · Is + αb ·D, (1)
and the average cost per unit time for RPS will be:
Cr(s, µ) = (1− α)b ·D +X(µ). (2)
Our model studies the scenario in which the RPS can sell its
energy to different entities (for example the BS and the grid).
This is captured in our model by considering the changes in the
load factor of the RPS. This load factor change will generate
the operation cost for the RPS and is represented by X(µ) in
the utility function.
Power-Supply Rate
µ
BS
Available Energy Resource at BS
  
S
RPS
Arriving 
Connections Inventory Demand
Compete with Each Other
Queue LengthEnergy Storage
Fig. 2. The renewable energy supply-inventory game model in which
the energy supply-inventory strategies can be viewed as a kind of energy
allocation strategies.
In the next section, we will use an M/M/1 make-to-stock
queue to show how Is and D are determined by s and µ. Here,
we just describe the basic model and principles. Because the
unsatisfied connection request is backlogged, and we use an
average cost criterion, it follows that the agents’ revenues are
independent of their costs. For example, if the RPS supplies
energy to the BS at a fixed wholesale price w (per unit energy
in a time unit) and the average number of accesses is λ in one
unit time, then the average revenue of the RPS is w · λ per
unit of time which is irrelevant to its strategy µ 3.
Thereafter, profit maximization and cost minimization lead
to the same solution. For convenience, we adopt a cost-
minimization framework. The RPS and the BS choose their
strategies (i.e., they must choose their strategy before observ-
ing the other agent’s strategy) with the objective to optimize
their individual energy reservation-related costs. Given the
model, the problem is formulated as a noncooperative strategic
game [33] in which : 1) the players are the BS and the RPS, 2)
the strategy of the BS and the RPS are s and µ, respectively,
and 3) the cost functions are given by the following equations
(3) and (4).
III. GAME AND EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
To analyze this game, we first obtain the average costs for
the two players for any given pair of strategies (s, µ). We then
prove that the game has a unique Nash equilibrium solution.
Finally, we compare the centralized optimal solution with the
Nash solution.
A. Cost Analysis
In an attempt to isolate and hence understand the impact
of energy inventory for the BS, we consider a queuing model
with an attached reservation: the mobile connection (traffic
transmission) demands arrive at a rate of λ connection de-
mands/unit time and are served by the green energy in the
storage; At the time instant when a connection arrives, the
BS place an energy replenishment order to the RPS which
satisfies the order with a rate µ. In this regard, the radio access
network request can be viewed as being served at a rate of µ
units energy/unit time. Consequently, the energy replenishment
operation at the BS behaves as a single-server queue whose
service rate is µ and demand rate is λ. Such a queuing policy
which is illustrated in Fig. 3, constitutes the central theme of
the subsequent cost analysis.
3If the UE departs and never returns, that potential revenue is lost. This
will lead to a totally different analysis, and be left for future work.
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Fig. 3. The proposed make-to-stock queue which has an energy storage
laying in between the end mobile user and the RPS.
Assuming one wireless connection consumes one unit en-
ergy in one unit time is a common assumption in existing
research works [9], [16], [19]. Here, we clarify how to decide
the unit energy and unit time. In wireless networks, the
transmission time interval (TTI, several milliseconds) is a
parameter that refers to the encapsulation of data from higher
layers into frames for transmission on the radio link layer,
thus related to the duration of a transmission on the radio
link. For example, the radio frame of an LTE system lasts 10
milliseconds [31]. Each connection could account for a number
of td TTIs. The dynamic power consumption coefficient is E
W (Joule/s) per connection. Thus, each connection demand
consumes td · TTI · E Joule in unit time. In other words, the
time unit is set to be td · TTI and each user may generate
several connection demands in a certain time duration. The
value of td · TTI can range from a few milliseconds to a
few seconds as it is related to QoS cost coefficient, since the
number of backlogged connections are calculated over these
time intervals. Without loss of generality, in simulations, the
time unit td ·TTI is set to be 1 second. For example, the energy
unit can be 24 Joule.
Such a queuing policy which is illustrated in Fig.3, consti-
tutes the central theme of the subsequent cost analysis. Let pj
be the probability that the BS has j connections in its queue
at steady state. Based on the classical birth-death process in
queuing theory [29], we have, for the statistical equilibrium,
pj = ρ
jp0, j = 1, 2, 3, ... where p0 = 1− ρ, and the condition
for a stable queuing system is given by ρ = λ
µ
< 1 where ρ
represents the load factor. Let Nq be the stationary number of
connections waiting at the queue. Then, Nq is geometrically
distributed with mean ρ1−ρ .
To simplify our analysis, we assume that Nq is a continuous
random variable when Nq ≥ s, and replace the geometric
distribution with an exponential distribution with parameter
ν = 1−ρ
ρ
= µ−λ
λ
. This continuous-state approximation can be
justified by a heavy traffic approximation, i.e., the traffic of
arriving connections, and generates mean queue lengths that
coincide with M/M/1 results for all server utilization levels
[24]. The heavy traffic approximation allows the incorporation
of general inter-arrival time and service time distributions 4.
In queueing theory, an M/M/1 queue represents the queuing
system having a single server, where arrivals are determined by
a Poisson process and job service times have an exponential
distribution. The average queue length depends on the load
4Note that the number of servers is asymptotically negligible after nor-
malization. Moreover, in the non exponential case, ν would be divided by
one-half of the sum of the squared coefficients of variation of the inter-arrival
and service time distributions, (c2
ia
+ c2
is
)/2.
factor, which is the ratio of the service demand rate and the
service supply rate. The heavy traffic condition means that the
queuing system has a large load factor, which corresponds to
the scenario that there is not enough green energy generation
for wireless networks. For example, future BSs may request
green energy from the small capacity energy supplier, i.e.,
the on-roof home green energy equipments. Moreover, our
formulation is also suitable to model small base stations
operating in rural areas, which may not have continuous access
to the green energy supplier with a high capacity.
Hence, under such a condition, no matter what kind of
distribution its output follows, we can use an exponential
distribution to analyze the RPS’s random output. Although this
continuous-state approximation may lead to slightly different
quantitative results (the approximation tends to underestimate
the optimal discrete energy reservation levels), it has no effect
on obtaining an insight into the system, which is the objective
of our study. Notice, the make-to-stock queuing model is
essentially a queuing system which can be used to examine
scenarios in which customers arrive for a given service, wait
if the service cannot start immediately and leave after being
served. The stock model is just introduced to reduce the
average waiting length. In other words, the storable property
of the energy can enable us to design the storage strategies
for using the green energy in the queueing service system.
Next, we consider the average power supply cost of the RPS,
X(µ) in equation (2). Recall that the maximum power produc-
tion rate of the RPS is µ0. The RPS provides the power for the
BS as a production process that has exponentially distributed
inter-production times with rate µ. Then, the remaining supply
capacity of RPS can be modeled as a Possion process with rate
µ0 − µ. Thus, if there are power supply requests from other
entities (i.e., other base stations or home appliances) with rate
λ0, their load factor will be increased by:
△µ = λ0
µ0 − µ −
λ0
µ0
=
λ0µ
µ0(µ0 − µ) .
Then, X(µ) = cs△µ represents the operation cost for the
RPS. The average queue length depends on the load factor,
which is the ratio of the service demand rate and the service
supply rate. Thus, the load factor is crucial to a queuing
system. If the load factor approaches 1, then the average queue
length will go to infinity. As a result, the QoS of the queue
system will be totally destroyed. For a stationary energy source
with infinite capacity, it is reasonable to assume that it will
not bear any QoS cost after deployment. However, a random
energy source has a direct impact on the QoS, which may then
impair the user’s experience of the network operator. This will
be detrimental to the operator who may now decide to choose
another energy supplier. As a result, the original supplier will
lose revenues. In this regard, such an impact will be a major
concern in green energy markets. Hence, we consider that the
RPS will also incur certain QoS cost in the system.
Without loss of generality, we normalize the expected
variable cost per unit time by dividing it by the reservation
cost rate c. Toward this end, we normalize the cost parameters
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Fig. 4. Illustration of renewable energy reservation cost and the backlogged
cost.
as follows:
b˜ =
b
c
, c˜s =
cs
c
λ0
µ0
, c˜ =
c
c
= 1.
To ease the notation, hereinafter, we omit the tildes from these
parameters. There is a one-to-one correspondence between ν
(we call it as normalized energy supply rate) and the the
RPS’s decision variable µ. Hence, the steady-state expected
normalized variable cost per unit time for the RPS and BS
can be investigated in terms of the two decision variables s
and ν.
Proposition 1. The BS’s average cost can be expressed by:
Co(s, ν) = s− 1− e
−νs
ν
+ αb
e−νs
ν
, (3)
while the RPS’s average cost is:
Cr(s, ν) = (1− α)be
−νs
ν
+ cs
ν + 1
ϕ− ν , (4)
where ϕ = µo
λ
− 1.
Proof: With continuous-state approximation, the expected
energy reservation level of the BS can be expressed as,
Is = E[(s−N)+] =
∫ s
0
(s− x)νe−νxdx = s− 1− e
−νs
ν
.
The expected backlogged users is,
D = E[(N − s)+] =
∫ ∞
s
(x− s)νe−νxdx = e
−νs
ν
. (5)
Substituting the above equations into (1) yields (3). Substitut-
ing X(µ) and (5) into (2) yields (4).
The backlogged cost and the reservation cost associated with
the queue model are illustrated in Fig.4. The system operates
on a periodic basis, i.e., several hours during which the energy
generation capacity and connection demand rate can be pre-
dicted. At the beginning of each period, the renewable power
production capacity and the access demand can be predicted
from the history record and atmospheric parameters which are
available from monitoring devices or sensors in the control and
monitoring system of a smart grid environment [22]. Notice,
our model assumes fixed energy prices and is a one-shot game.
Thus, no matter whether the RPS has a storage or not, it must
satisfy the energy requests from the BS rather than store the
energy. If the RPS decides to sell its electricity to different time
while accounting for future QoS impacts and different energy
prices, a totally new repeated game model over time horizon
should be designed. This interesting extension is currently not
investigated here, and will be subject of future research.
The choice of a strategy s by the BS corresponds to placing
an energy replenish order to the RPS. Thus, at the beginning
of the game, the BS should have charged its energy storage to
time
The Game
...
Parameters Predict and Make Strategic Decisons
Power reservation (s units)
Fig. 5. Illustration of the operation of the system.
an inventory of s energy units. The source of the charge can
be the electric gird or the RPS. When the game begins, the
RPS supplies the energy with the determined rate ν and the
BS serves the UEs with the renewable energy, thereby striking
a balance between reducing the energy bill and maintaining
the QoS. The operation of the system is shown in Fig. 5.
B. System Performance and Game Solution
In this subsection, we will characterize the Nash equilibrium
(NE) strategies [32] and identify the causes of inefficiency in
the decentralized operation. Toward this end, we first prove the
existence and uniqueness of the NE and then compare the Nash
solution with the centralized optimal solution. Subsequently,
we present a set of simple linear contracts to coordinate the
system. Finally, we discuss the adaptive power management
of the BS based on the NE solution.
1) The Nash Equilibrium of the Game: In a decentralized
game-theoretic formulation, the BS and the RPS select their
individual strategies s and ν in order to minimize their own
cost functions. In other words, the BS will choose s to mini-
mize Co(s, ν), assuming that the RPS chooses ν to minimize
Cr(s, ν); likewise, the RPS will simultaneously choose ν to
minimize Cs(s, ν), assuming the BS chooses s to minimize
Co(s, ν). A pair of strategies (s∗, ν∗) is an NE if neither the
BS nor the RPS can gain from a unilateral deviation from
these strategies, i.e.,
s∗(ν) = argmin
x
Co(x, ν
∗),
ν∗(s) = argmin
x
Cr(x, s
∗).
(6)
There are two important issues regarding the determination
of the NE: existence and uniqueness. We will show that a
NE always exists in the game and the uniqueness of the equi-
librium is always guaranteed. First, let us define an auxiliary
function in terms of the BS’s backlogged share α, backlogged
cost b, and RPS’s supply cost cs:
f =
√
b− αb + (b− αb) ln(1 + αb)
cs(1 + αb)
.
The backlogged cost split factor α ≤ 1, thus f is always a
real value. The function f is used to make the Nash solution
concise and will play a prominent role in our analysis.
Theorem 1. The proposed noncooperative game admits a
unique NE,
ν∗ =
fϕ√
1 + ϕ+ f
, s∗ =
(
√
1 + ϕ+ f) ln(1 + αb)
fϕ
. (7)
Proof: s∗(ν) is the BS’s reaction curve representing the
optimal energy reservation level given a supply rate ν. As
7(3) is concave in s, s∗(ν) is characterized by the first-order
condition
νs∗(ν) = ln(1 + αb). (8)
Using a similar argument and (8), we find that the RPS’s
reaction curve ν∗(s) satisfies,
ν2
ν − ϕ =
f
cs(1 + ϕ)
. (9)
The unique solution to equations (8) and (9) yields (7).
From Theorem 1, the resulting equilibrium costs C∗o and
C∗r are,
C∗o = Co(s
∗, ν∗) = s∗,
C∗r = Cr(s
∗, ν∗) =
b− αb
(1 + αb)ν∗
+
s∗f
ln(1 + αb)
.
Since the existence of the N.E. is guaranteed, so the tradi-
tional best response dynamics [32] can be used to converge
to the NE. For the proposed game model, we have got the
analysis solution of the NE. Consequently, the RPS and the
BS are able to make a decision about the strategies at the
beginning of the game.
Because the function f is decreasing in α and is increasing
in b for b > 0, it follows that as α increases, the BS becomes
more concerned with backlogged UEs and increases his energy
reservation level (f ↓→ s∗ ↑), while the RPS cares less about
backlogged users and builds less energy supply rate ν∗ (f ↓→
ν∗ ↓).
2) Distributed algorithm to achieve the NE: Generally, for
the scenarios that the analysis solution of the NE cannot be
obtained, finding distributed algorithms to reach a NE is both
a challenging and important task. One popular algorithm is
the so-called best response dynamic which allows the players
to take turns choosing their best response (optimal strategy
at a current time) to the state of the game in the previous
period. If this process of iterative best responses converges, it
is guaranteed to reach an NE of the game [33]. Nevertheless,
the convergence of best response dynamics is only guaranteed
for certain classes of games, such as supermodular games
[34]. In order to use the best response algorithm, we show
that the proposed game is supermodular by reversing the
order on one of the strategies. Recall that we use a cost
minimization framework. Thus, the supermodularity for our
model is equivalent to the requirement that the utility function
is twice continuously differentiable and ∂
2Co(s,ν)
∂s ∂ν
≤ 0 and
∂2Cr(s,ν)
∂s ∂ν
≤ 0.
The second order derivatives are given as follows.
∂2Co(s, ν)
∂s ∂ν
= se−νs + αbe−νs ≥ 0.
∂2Cr(s, ν)
∂s ∂ν
= (1− α)be−νs ≥ 0.
As a result, this leads to a submodular game [34].
However, the proposed game can be converted into a
supermodular game when ν is ordered in the reverse order:
∂2Co(s, ν)
∂s ∂(−ν) ≤ 0,
∂2Cr(s, ν)
∂s ∂(−ν) ≤ 0.
Notice that we do not change neither the payoffs nor
the structure of the game, we only alter the ordering of
the one player’s strategy space. This approach only works
in two-player games, and the submodular games with more
than two players may exhibit dramatically different properties
than the supermodular ones [34]. Hence, for the proposed
game, the decreasing best responses which means that each
player’s best strategy response function is decreasing in other
player’s strategy, will converge to the NE point. Moreover, for
submodular games with finite strategies, the work in [35] has
proposed algorithms using the fictitious play to make the game
dynamics converge to a pure equilibrium point.
Remark 1: The value of α depends on a variety of factors,
such as the structure of the market, and the users’ expectations.
At one extreme, if the RPS has a monopolistic position in the
market with many competing BSs, α will be near 1 and the
BS has to sustain the backlogged costs. At the other extreme,
the RPS could be part of a competitive RPS market, and, thus,
a poor user service at the BS will mostly harm the RPS as the
cellular network can switch to another RPS. Then, α will be
near 0. Clearly, our model allows to capture all such scenarios.
In practice, the RPS’ will eventually pay a certain cost for a
delayed transmission due to the fact that delayed users might
lead the network operator to either switch to another RPS or
re-negotiate its contract with the RPS.
Remark 2: If the traffic load is served with a combination
of a renewable power source and the electric grid, we should
design the adaptive power management scheme for the BS to
control the purchase of energy generated from the renewable
source (with price P1) and energy from the electric grid (with
price P2). The conventional energy has a stationary source.
So that, there is no need to account for the energy storage
for using energy from the conventional source. Let λ¯ be the
total arriving rate of connections. Denote the arriving rate of
connections served by the renewable energy as λ, then the
arriving rate of connections powered by the electric grid is
λ¯ − λ. Define Cls as the cost of the BS that schedules the
load to be served by two kinds of energy sources. Based on
the Nash equilibrium solution, we get,
Cls = C
∗
o + P1λ+ P2(λ¯− λ)
=
(
√
1 + ϕ+ f) ln(1 + αb)
fϕ
+ P1λ+ P2(λ¯ − λ),
where ϕ = µo
λ
− 1 and C∗o is the BS’s cost at the NE. The
optimal management discipline can be got by the first order
derivation ∂Cls
∂λ
= 0 or at the boundaries λ = 0 and λ = λ¯.
We assume that the energy price of the electric grid and the
energy price of the RPS are fixed during one operation period.
This is the case where the energy price is determined by the
government or a contract between the user and the energy
company [36]. For example, a green pricing utility program
in US department of energy shows that the green energy from a
certain supplier has a fixed price [36]. The fixed prices setting
can help us to understand the interaction between the random
green power generations and the dynamics of the energy
consumption of mobile networks, especially considering the
QoS impact and decentralized energy allocation strategies.
If a dynamic pricing scheme is introduced between multiple
8users, then the energy supply rate, storage level, QoS cost
and prices should be examined at the same time. Currently,
this challenging but interesting issue is still an open problem.
Nonetheless, the developed model can serve as a building
block for more elaborate, dynamic pricing mechanisms in
future work.
3) Centralized Optimal Solution: Our performance bench-
mark for the decentralized system is the integrated/centralized
system, i.e., there is a single decision maker that simultane-
ously optimizes the energy reservation level s and the capacity
variable ν. This may be the case when both the RPS and the
BS belong to the same operator. The total average expected
normalized cost per unit time of the centralized system can
then be expressed as,
C(s, ν) = Co(s, ν) + Cr(s, ν)
= s− 1
ν
+ (1 + b)
e−νs
ν
+ cs
ν + 1
ϕ− ν .
(10)
We introduce an auxiliary variable, γ = ln(1 + b). The
centralized solution is given in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. The optimal centralized solution is the unique
solution to the first-order conditions, and is given by
ν¯ =
ϕ
√
csγ√
csγ + cs
√
ϕ+ 1
, s¯ = γ
√
csγ + cs
√
ϕ+ 1
ϕ
√
csγ
. (11)
The resulting cost is
C(s¯, ν¯) =
1
ϕ
(
cs + γ + 2
√
csγ(1 + ϕ)
)
. (12)
Proof: The function C(s, ν) defined in equation (10) is
continuously differentiable and bounded below by 0 in B =
{(s, ν)|s ≥ 0, ν > 0}. Thus, a global minimum is either a local
interior minimum that satisfies the first-order conditions or an
element of the boundary of B. From the first-order conditions,
we get 

∂C(s, ν)
∂s
= 0,
∂C(s, ν)
∂ν
= 0,
⇒


sν = γ,
ν = ν¯,
s = s¯.
(13)
Substituting the above equations into equation (10) yields
equation (12). The only interior point that is a candidate for the
global minimum is (s¯, ν¯). In addition, the Hessian of C(s, ν)
at (s¯, ν¯) is given by,
H(s¯, ν¯) =
[
ν¯ s¯
s¯ γ(γ+2)
ν¯3
+ 2cs(ϕ+1)(ϕ−ν¯)3
]
From (11), we get ν¯ ≤ ϕ. Thus, ν¯ is a feasible value. Also,
γ = ln(1+ b) > 0, for b > 0, c > 0. Thus, the Hessian matrix
is positive definite and (s¯, ν¯) is the unique local minimum
in the interior of B. Now, we consider the boundary values:
lim
ν→0
C(s, ν) → ∞ for s ≥ 0, lim
ν→ϕ
C(s, ν) → ∞ for s ≥ 0,
lim
s→∞
C(s, ν)→∞. When s = 0, the boundary value is
C(0, ν) =
b
ν
+ cs
ν + 1
ϕ− ν .
Obviously, C(0, ν) is a convex function of ν. The first order
derivation of C(0, ν) is
∂C(0, ν)
∂ν
= 0⇒ ν =
√
b√
cs(1 + ϕ) +
√
b
ϕ ≤ ϕ. (14)
The solution in above equation is also a feasible value. Then,
substituting this solution into C(0, ν), we get
C(0, ν) ≥ cs
ϕ
(
1 +
b
cs
+ 2
√
b
cs
(1 + ϕ)
)
.
Since b ≥ ln(1 + b), we derive C(0, ν) ≥ C(s¯, ν¯). Hence,
(s¯, ν¯) is the unique global minimum for C(s, ν).
As expected, the optimal power supply rate for the BS
decreases with the supply cost cs and increases with the
backlogged cost b. Similarly, because supply rate and power
reservation provide alternative means to avoid backlogged con-
nection requests, the optimal base-reservation level increases
with the supply cost and with the normalized backlogged cost.
Finally, we can observe that the cost-split factor α plays no
role in this central optimization, because the utility transfer
between the BS and the RPS does not affect the centralized
cost.
Note that the centralized optimal solution is based on the
assumption that the BS and the RPS belong to the same
operator. However, the BS and the RPS may not have a
common benefit such as they belong to different operators
[9]. In this sense, each one will seek to selfishly optimize its
individual cost and, in this case, the NE can be considered
as the solution in such a decentralized system. It is clear
that the decentralized operation is less efficient in terms of
the total system profit. In next subsection, we will propose
a contract-based approach which can be used to improve the
decentralized operation.
4) Comparison of Solutions and Coordination via Con-
tracts: According to (7) and (13) , the first-order conditions are
sν = ln(1+b) in the centralized solution and sν = ln(1+αb)
in the Nash solution. Hence, the two solutions are not equal
when α < 1. And, as discussed earlier, the NE in the α = 1
case is an unstable system.
The magnitude of the inefficiency of a NE is typically
quantified by comparing the costs under the centralized and
Nash solutions. We compute the competition penalty 5, which
is defined as the percentage increase in variable cost of the
NE over the centralized solution,
Pα,cs =
C∗r + C
∗
o − C(s¯, ν¯)
C(s¯, ν¯)
=
C∗r + C
∗
o
C(s¯, ν¯)
− 1. (15)
It is clear that, in general, the decentralized operation is less
efficient in terms of the total system profit. A coordination
mechanism based on static transfer payments can be used to
improve the decentralized operation. In particular, the transfer
payment modifies the cost functions in (3) and (4) for the BS
and RPS, respectively, to
C˜o(s, ν) = Co(s, ν)− ε′(s, ν),
C˜r(s, ν) = Cr(s, ν) + ε
′(s, ν).
5Note that this concept is different from the popular concept of price of
anarchy [33] which is defined as the ratio between the “worst equilibrium”
and the optimal “centralized” solution.
9The choice of ε′ that coordinates the system is not unique.
One possibility is to define the transfer in such a way that the
modified cost functions replicate a cost-sharing situation. That
is, we can set ε such that C˜r(s, ν) = εC, C˜o(s, ν) = (1−ε)C
where ε ∈ [0, 1] is a splitting factor and C is the centralized
cost function defined in equation (10). Such a cost sharing
forces the transfer payment to satisfy,
ε′(s, ν) = εCo(s, ν)− (1 − ε)Cr(s, ν).
With such a payment transfer, the RPS and the BS have
aligned objectives and the centralized solution (v¯, s¯) is the
unique NE. The BS and RPS must be better off under the
NE with the transfer payments than under the NE without the
transfer payments, for example,
C∗r ≥ εC, C∗o ≥ (1− ε)C.
After algebraic manipulation, we get
ε ∈
[
C∗r
C
− Pα,cs ,
C∗r
C
]
∩ [0, 1].
From a practical perspective, a direct cost-sharing nego-
tiation based on total cost probably dominates the transfer-
payment approach because it does not require any special
accounting of cost (in terms of supply and backlogged costs).
Remark 3. A cooperative game may yield better results than
the pure non-cooperative result. In cooperative games, there
are various solution concepts, i.e., Nash bargaining solution,
core, Shapley value and so on. In order to enable the co-
operative formulation, we should define the profit/energy cost
saving that each single player could generate. For example, we
can define the single player’s payoff as the utility it obtains
in the non-cooperative setting. Then, the cooperative solution
(e.g., via a Shapley value) will tell us how important each
player is to the overall cooperation, and what payoff he or
she can reasonably expect. Indeed, the non-cooperative game
with contract coordination also generates a system optimal
solution, and thus the coordination can be viewed as transfer-
able utilities in a cooperative setting. In addition, cooperative
games which mainly study the interactions among coalitions
of players a suitable framework for handling dense networks
and can be studied in future work.
IV. CAPACITY ALLOCATION GAME WITH MULTIPLE BSS
In this section, we consider a setting in which a single mo-
nopolistic RPS sells energy to a set of N = {1..., N}, N ≥ 2
BSs. The RPS can produce no more than µ0 units during
the period. We consider that UEs of each BS cannot switch
to another BS. This is the case for which BSs are owned
by different operators 6. BSs are considered to have different
arrival rates due to a variety of reasons including geographic
locations, operator promotion plans, and pricing strategies.
The RPS has a monopoly over the energy market and is thus
considered to not bear backlogged cost and the load increasing
6If the BSs are under a price competition in spectrum accessing market.
The energy allocation mechanism and the spectrum access scheme will affect
each other. As a result, the properties of allocation mechanisms would be
significantly different, and are not currently investigated here.
cost, i.e., α = 1, cs = 0 in (4). We will investigate how RPS
allocates the limited energy capacity to BSs, and how induce
the BSs to truthfully report their optimal demand. Toward
this end, we will propose a noncooperative capacity allocation
game and address its dominant equilibrium.
First, we examine the cost function of a BS in considered
setting. Let Γ = {µ1, ..., µN} be the energy supply rate vector
of the RPS, and si be the energy reservation strategy of BS
i. Then, the normalized energy supply rate of BS i is denoted
as νi and the backlogged cost of BS i is bi. As discussed
in Section 4.2.2, as α → 1, the RPS will set its energy
supply rate µ→ 0 for a BS. In order to prevent this outcome
in the monopolistic market, we set that BS i is charged an
incentive price p to the RPS for the supply rate µi. Based on
the M/M/1 make-to-stock queuing analysis, the steady-state
expected normalized cost per unit time for BS i is,
C¯i(µi, si, λi)
= pµi + P1λi + P2(λ¯i − λi) + Cio(si, νi)|α=1,
= pµi + P1λi + P2(λ¯i − λi) + si − 1− (bi + 1)e
−νisi
νi
,
where λi is the arrival rate of connections served with the
renewable energy of BS i, and λ¯i is the total arriving rate of
connections of BS i. Cio(si, νi)|α=1 is backlogged cost and
store self-discharge cost defined in (3).
Proposition 3. The global minimum of C¯i(µi, si, λi) is the
solution that satisfies,
µˆi =
√
λi ln(1 + bi)
p
+ λi, sˆi =
√
pλi ln(1 + bi).
The resulting cost is
C¯mini (µˆi, sˆi, λi) = 2
√
pλi ln(1 + bi)+(p+P1)λi+P2(λ¯i−λi).
Proof: We introduce the following auxiliary function,
C′i(µi, si) = pµi + si −
1− (bi + 1)e−νisi
νi
.
The solution to the first-order conditions of C′i(µi, si)
∂C′i(µi, si, λi)
∂si
= 0,⇒siνi = ln(1 + bi),
∂C′i(µi, si, λi)
∂µ
= 0,⇒
[
− (bi + 1)(siνi + 1)e
−siνi
ν2i
+
1
ν2i
] 1
λi
+ p = 0,
is given by νˆi = µˆi−λiλi =
√
ln(1+bi)
(pλi)
, sˆi =
√
pλi ln(1 + bi).
Using a technique similar to Theorem 1, we can prove that
the Hessian matrix of C′i(si, νi) at (sˆi, νˆi) is positive definite
and the boundary values can be excluded. Thus, the global
minimum of C′i(µi, si) is the unique solution to the first-order
conditions. And, the minimum cost is 2
√
pλi ln(1 + bi)+pλi.
The individual BSs have private information regarding the
optimal energy demand, and will competitively submit their
orders to the RPS. The RPS allocate the energy supply rates
to the BSs according to an allocation mechanism. Define A =
{a ∈ RN : ai ≥ 0 and
∑N
i=1 ai ≤ µ0} as a set of allocations.
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We call each a ∈ A as a feasible allocation. Let m be the
renewable energy supply rate vector that BSs order with each
element mi being the supply rate ordered by BS i ∈ N . Let
m−i be the vector of other BSs’ orders. Then, we have the
definition of an allocation mechanism.
Definition 1. An allocation mechanism is a function g that
assigns a feasible allocation to each vector of orders, g(m) ∈
A. Then, gi(m) is BS i’s energy supply rate.
The RPS can never allocate to a BS more than the BS orders,
i.e., gi(m) ≤ mi. The RPS should choose an allocation mech-
anism g and then broadcast the mechanism to all BSs. All BSs
will simultaneously submit their energy demand orders to the
RPS according to the allocation mechanism g. Based on both
the connection demand and the noticed allocation mechanism,
each BS i determines its ordered energy supply rate mi. Due
to the limited capacity of the RPS, BSs will compete with each
other in order to get their individual favorable energy supply.
For instance, BSs can report larger energy demands rather than
optimal values to get more allocations. Such a competition
leads to the formulation of a capacity allocation game in which
players are BSs, and the strategy of each player is its ordered
renewable energy supply rate mi. The cost function of BS i
are given by C¯i(µi, si, λi) with µi = gi(m). Then, we state
the following equilibrium definition.
Definition 2. Assume that all BSs truthfully reporting their
optimal demands, m∗. Then, reporting m∗ is a dominant
equilibrium of the capacity allocation game under mechanism
g, if and only if ∀ m,
C¯i(gi(m
∗
i ,m−i), si, λi) ≤ C¯i(gi(mi,m−i), si, λi), ∀ i ∈ N .
In a dominant equilibrium, each BS has an energy order
that minimizes its cost regardless of the energy orders of the
other BSs. A dominant equilibrium is a stronger notion of
equilibrium than the Nash equilibrium (NE) in which each
player is assumed to know the equilibrium strategies of the
other players, and no player has anything to gain by changing
only its own strategy unilaterally [32]. In this regard, the NE
definition of the game can be obtained by replacing m−i
with m∗−i. We are particularly interested in RPS’s allocation
mechanism under which the BSs report their optimal energy
supply demands in a dominant equilibrium.
More specifically, if BSs ordered exactly their needs, the
RPS could determine how much capacity it needs to al-
locate. Conversely, manipulation may generate undesirable
consequences for the system, i.e., preventing the RPS from
determining which BS is in reality needing the most energy.
Some BSs with high expected demands may receive too little
and others with low expected demand may receive too much.
At the end, the system ends up serving all BSs poorly. Note
that, the allocation mechanism design implies that all BSs will
observe the same price for green energy. Such a model allows
to capture scenarios in which having an auction mechanisms
may be too complicate or in which there is a single, unified
price imposed by a utility company or the government.
In what follows, we will study the mechanism design prop-
erties, and subsequently we will investigate the equilibrium
of the capacity allocation game. The two main challenges
of mechanism design are stability and efficiency. Two typical
criteria are generally applied to mechanism design: incentive
compatibility and optimality defined as follows:
Definition 3. An allocation mechanism g is said to be incen-
tive compatible (IC) or truth-inducing if the case in which
all BSs place their orders truthfully at their optimal profits
constitutes an dominant equilibrium of g.
Definition 4. An allocation mechanism g is a Pareto allocation
mechanism if it maximizes the sum of BSs’ profits assuming
all BSs truthfully submit their optimal orders.
In general, Pareto optimality is a state of allocation of
resources in which it is impossible to make any one individual
better off without making at least one individual worse off.
Here, we use the definition of Pareto allocation mechanism
following [38]. Note, the social welfare maximization implies
Pareto optimality, whereas the versa does not hold. One of the
most popular allocation mechanism is the so-called propor-
tional allocation, for which: gi(m) = min{mi, µ0 mi∑N
j=1
mj
}.
In [38], it is shown that for a kind of utility functions,
the proportional allocation is actually a Pareto allocation
mechanism. Next, we show that the proportional allocation
mechanism is not a Pareto mechanism when the total renew-
able power production capacity is less than total BSs’ orders.
Lemma 1. If BSs have different connection arrival rates
and order truthfully their optimal energy supply rates m
(µ0 <
∑N
i mi), the proportional allocation is not a Pareto
mechanism.
Proof: Based on Proposition 3, the optimization problem
of total BSs’ profits can be formulated as follows:
min
Γ∈A
N∑
i=1
[
2
√
pλi ln(1 + bi) + (p+ P1 − P2)λi + P2λ¯i
]
.
s.t. µi =
√
λi ln(1 + bi)
p
+ λi, (16)
N∑
i=1
µi ≤ µ0, λi ≤ λ¯i, µi ≥ 0. i ∈ N . (17)
The Larangian function of the original problem is,
L(ǫ, η, λ)
=
N∑
i=1
[
2
√
pλi ln(1 + bi) + (p+ P1)λi + P2(λ¯i − λi)
]
+ ǫ(
N∑
i=1
µi − µ0) +
N∑
i=1
[
ηi(λi − λ¯i)
]
.
where ǫ ≥ 0 and ηi ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, ..., N .
The optimal solution λ∗1, ..., λ∗N satisfies the necessary
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions which are,
∂
∂λ∗i
L(ǫ, η, λ∗) = 0, i = 1, ..., N, (18)
ǫ(
N∑
i=1
µ∗i − µ0) = 0,
N∑
i=1
µ∗i − µ0 ≤ 0, (19)
ηi(λ
∗
i − λ¯i) = 0, λ∗i − λ¯i ≤ 0, λ∗i ≥ 0, i ∈ N . (20)
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Fig. 6. An example to show the concavity of the objective function.
where µ∗i is defined by (18) with λi = λ∗i . By further
developing (20), we obtain,
√
λ∗i =
(2p+ ǫ)
√
ln(1 + bi)
2
√
p(P2 − p− P1 − ǫ− ηi) . (21)
Assume that the proportional allocation mechanism is a
Pareto mechanism, we then have µ∗i = gi(m) = µ0 mi∑N
j=1
mj
<
λ¯i. Then, from (22), we get ηi = 0 ∀ i ∈ N . Thus, from
equation (23), we derive λ∗1 = λ∗2 = ... = λ∗N which
contradicts with the proportional allocation. This completes
the proof.
If P2 ≤ P1 + p, all BSs will order a zero renewable
energy supply rate, thus we just consider the case in which
P2 > P1 + p. The solution to C¯mini (si, νi, λi)= P2λ¯i is
λˆi =
4c ln(1+bi)
(P2−P1−p)2
. The objective function of the optimization
problem is a concave function as shown in Fig. 6. Thus, the
global minimum is achieved at the boundary. In this respect,
when all BSs have an identical bi, i ∈ N , a simple Pareto
mechanism discipline can be designed as follows. Assuming
that all BSs truthfully report their demand, a larger demand
will be satisfied with a certain priority. If a BS receives an
allocation that is less λˆi, the allocation will be rejected. The
RPS then adjusts the allocation for this BS to zero, and the
BS will wait for the next allocation period to announce its
demand.
When the demand exceeds the capacity size, the BSs may
inflate orders so as to be allocated more than they need.
Hence, by increasing the order quantity, each BS is able to
decrease the allocation quantity for competitors. Next, we
investigate how to design a mechanism which can induce the
BSs truthfully to report their energy demand. We arrange the
BS in decreasing order of their order quantities, i.e., {m1 ≥
m2 ≥ ... ≥ mN}, nˆ be the largest integer less than or equal to
N such that gnˆ(m, nˆ) ≤ mnˆ. Then, 1nˆ (µ0−
∑N
nˆ+1mj) means
that BSs other than those whose indices are larger than nˆ, will
get an uniform allocation. Notice nˆ is inherently determined
by the allocation mechanism, and is not specified by the RPS.
In this regard, we propose the adaptive uniform allocation
mechanism shown in Algorithm 1. Under such a mechanism,
initially, the BSs with orders less than a threshold index nˆ
receive the same energy supply rate as their orders, and the
rest of the BSs receive mi. Then, the remainder of the capacity
is divided by the number of BSs indexed greater than nˆ. If a
BS receives an allocation in less than λˆi, it will reject the
allocation. The RPS adjusts the allocation for this BS to zero.
Thus, it also can be viewed as a take-or-leave choice for each
BS. Note that the uniform allocation mechanism always favors
small BSs.
Algorithm 1 Proposed adaptive uniform allocation mecha-
nism.
RPS Performs:
1: Arrange the BS in decreasing order of their order quanti-
ties, i.e., {m1 ≥ m2 ≥ ... ≥ mN}. nˆ is the largest integer
less than or equal to N such that gnˆ(m, nˆ) ≤ mnˆ where,
gi(m, nˆ) =


1
nˆ
(
µ0 −
N∑
nˆ+1
mj
)
, i ≤ nˆ,
mi, i > nˆ,
(22)
BSs Perform:
2: if 0 < gi(m) ≤ µˆi =
√
λˆi
ln(1+b)
p
+ λˆi, i ∈ N then
3: The BS i sends a message indexed i to the RPS;
4: end if
RPS Performs:
5: if the RPS receives a message i then
6: gi(m) = 0;
7: end if
Output: g(m), which is an energy supply rate allocation for
BSs.
Theorem 2. If the RPS uses the proposed allocation mech-
anism in Algorithm 1, it will minimize the cost for each BS
to report its optimal energy demand, regardless of the energy
orders of the other BSs, thereby reaching a dominant equilib-
rium. Moreover, the proposed mechanism is truth-inducing.
Proof: Assume that all BSs truthfully report their optimal
demands, m∗. Then, we should prove that reporting m∗ is a
dominant equilibrium under the adaptive uniformly allocation
mechanism. We observe from Algorithm 1 that, by ordering
more than m∗i , there will be two cases for BS i.
The first is that BS i received an allocation that is less
than m∗i under truthful reporting. In this case, inflating the
order cannot result in more allocation, since the BSs whose
indices are smaller than nˆ will be uniformly allocated an
energy supply rate. The second case is the one in which a
certain BS i received m∗i under the truthfully reporting. In this
situation, if there are some other BSs to inflate their orders,
BS i still receives m∗i because the mechanism always favors
a BS with a smaller demand. Also, if some other BSs reduce
their orders, there will be enough available capacity for BS i
to get its optimal energy supply rate demand m∗i under such
a mechanism.
Similarly, if a BS i received a zero allocation, ordering
less m∗i still results in a zero allocation. For a BS i which
received an allocation in less than m∗i , ordering less m∗i cannot
increase its allocation. For the remaining cases in which a
BS i received m∗i , ordering less than m∗i will reduce the its
allocation. Thus, using the proposed mechanism, all BSs will
truthfully report their optimal energy demands, which also
constitutes a dominant equilibrium.
It is easy to see that adaptive uniformly allocation is not
necessarily efficient. But, by choosing the IC mechanism, the
RPS can acquire truthful energy demand information of BSs.
This could lead the RPS’s secure decision-makings on capacity
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Fig. 7. The PDF in different traffic conditions.
planning and sales planning.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
In this section, we study how the RPS allocate its energy
supply rate with a limited capacity and how the BS optimize
their renewable energy storage based on the predictable traffic
condition. Further, the energy supply allocation with multiple
BSs is also shown.
A. Parameters setting
For our simulations, we use the following parameters. The
time unit is set to one minute, while the dynamic power
consumption coefficient is 24 W (Joule/s) per connection,
which is similar to that in [16] [18]. Without loss of generality,
the time unit td·TTI is set to be 1 second. Thus, the energy unit
is 24 Joule. According to a report from an independent carbon
footprints research group, the average national electrical price
is 12 cents/kWh in the US [39]. Other countries such as
Denmark, Germany and Spain may have more expensive
electricity prices that can exceed 30 cents/kWh. For the green
energy price, a green pricing utility program in US department
of energy, shows that prices of different green power suppliers
vary from about 0.5 cents/kWh to 4.5 cents/kWh 7 [36]. We
can observe that the green power could be much cheaper than
the conventional power.
We use cents as the power price unit. For example, the
renewable energy has a low price (e.g., 2.5 cents per kWh), and
the electric energy has a high price (e.g., 25 cents per kWh).
These values fall within the range of the prices discussed in
[39] and [36]. Then, the energy cost of a connection served
by the electric source will be 0.01 cents per minute, and the
energy cost of a connection served by the renewable source is
0.001 cents per minute. The energy reservation cost factor c is
set to 0.001. Thus, the reservation cost with Is units average
energy storage is 0.001Is cents per minute. The units of the
backlogged cost b, and the supply cost of the RPS cs are also
set to cents per minute. In simulations, the cost accounts for
1000 minutes (16.7 hours), i.e, we can set P1 = 1, P2 = 10
and b = 10 cents per 1000 minutes.
7The price of green energy is often expressed as a price “premium” above
the price of conventional power in order to use the blended green and
conventional power [36], [37].
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B. The heavy traffic approximation
In Table I and Fig. 7, we illustrate that the continuous-
state approximation can be justified by a heavy traffic ap-
proximation with an incorporation of general inter-arrival time
and service time distributions. For instance, we assume that
the traffic of the BS alternates between a high state and a
low state, where the traffic is in “high” with the connections’
inter-arrival time exponentially distributed with rate 3.5 (e.g.,
connections/second) and in the “low” state with such a rate
2.3. The traffic model can be viewed as a 2-type hyper-
exponential distribution, i.e., there are two different mobile
services with different request rates. We consider that the
two type services arrive with an equal probability. Thus, the
average connections’ inter-arrival time is 12
1
2.3 +
1
2
1
3.5 = 0.36.
We consider that the renewable energy supply rate follows
a normal distribution with the mean µ 8. Table I shows the
average queue length where ρ = 10.36µ . And, the probability
density function (PDF) of the queue length is plotted in Fig. 7.
We can observe that the continuous-state approximation is
quite accurate when the average queue length is equal or larger
than 2.
TABLE I
THE AVERAGE QUEUE LENGTH UNDER DIFFERENT TRAFFIC CONDITIONS.
ρ = 0.39 ρ = 0.70 ρ = 0.80 ρ = 0.93
Analysis 1.0 2.3 4.3 14.6
Simulation 0.7 2.4 4.2 14.2
C. Analysis for the single BS scenario
Fig. 8 verifies the results pertaining to the centralized global
minimum of the system cost where ν¯ = 0.33, s¯ = 7.29, and
C(ν¯, s¯) = 17.19 for b = 10, cs = 5, ϕ = 1. Recall that ν is
the normalized energy supply rate, i.e., ν = µ−λ
λ
. Thus, the
load factor is ρ = λ/µ = 0.75 in the global minimum state.
The system consists of the energy reservation cost and the
renewable energy supply cost. Each of them depends on both
the values of s and ν. We can observe that for a certain system
8The normal distribution is often used to model random noise. Here, we
use such a distribution for our simulations. But, our analysis also applies to
general distributions under heavy traffic situations.
13
1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Th
e 
sy
st
em
 c
os
t
The ratio of RPS capacity to the connection demand rate µ 0
λ
 
 
c
s
=5
c
s
=8
(a) The minimum system cost.
1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
The ratio of RPS capacity to the connection demand rate µ 0
λ
Th
e 
op
tim
al
 ν
 
 
c
s
=5
c
s
=8
(b) Optimal energy supply rate.
1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
The ratio of RPS capacity to the connection demand rate µ 0
λ
Th
e 
op
tim
al
 s
 
 
c
s
=5
c
s
=8
(c) Optimal energy reservation.
Fig. 9. The minimum system cost, optimal energy supply rate and energy reservation with different parameters.
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Fig. 10. Illustration of the NE.
cost (e.g., 17.96), s · ν will be a fixed value. This means that
increasing s has the same effect as reducing ν to achieve such
a system cost. Thus, it is easy to imagine that there will be
a competition between adjusting s and ν in the decentralized
system.
The system cost and the Nash solution are only related to
the ratio of the capacity of the RPS to the connection demand
rate, i.e., µ0
λ
. The output of the RPS depends on the weather
condition, the size of power generator i.e., the solar panel, and
the time on one day. For example, in [40], it is shown that the
10-second irradiance is about 500 W/m2 at a measure point
in Canada over a clear sky at 12:00, and this value reduces
to about 200 W/m2 at 10:00. The efficiency of the solar cell
is defined as the ratio of energy output from the solar cell to
input energy from the sun. Generally, the efficiency of a solar
cell could be 20%, and a recent report shows that the 44.7%
efficiency has been achieved with a special technology [41].
With regards to the wind energy, the work in [28] shows that
a small wind turbine located on the roof can generate a 150
W output.
In Fig. 9, µ0 varies from 1.2λ to 2.2λ. Recall that the energy
coefficient of each connection is 24 W(Joule/S). Consider
λ = 1.5 connections/second as an example. Each connection
accounts for one second, and consumes 240 Joule. Then,
µ0 = 1.2λ means that the RPS has an average µ0 = 4.32k
Joule output in 10-second, which is 432 W. As shown in Fig. 9,
by increasing µ0
λ
, the optimal system cost reduces and the
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optimal energy reservation level s also can be reduced. In
other words, if the RPS has an efficient production capacity,
i.e., the solar panel experiences a clear sky, the BS can make
a small reservation, and the supply cost of the RPS can be
also reduced.
Next, we study the decentralized situations. Set b =
10, cs = 5, ϕ = 1. In Fig. 10, we show the best responses
of the BS and the RPS at the NE. Neither the BS nor the
RPS can reduce their individual cost via a unilateral deviation
from these strategies at the NE (ν∗, s∗). The value of the
splitting factor α is exogenously determined. As α increases,
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Fig. 11. Equilibrium costs analysis in which R&B represents reservation-and-backlogged, and S&B represents supply-and-backlogged.
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Fig. 13. System performance at the NE, and the energy management based
on the NE.
the BS incurs more backlogged costs. We can observe from
Fig. 10(a) that, a larger s∗ corresponds to a larger α. This
means that the BS should reserve more energy to make up for
the backlogged cost with a larger α. For the RPS, a larger α
incurs less splitting backlogged cost. Thus, as shown in Fig.
10(b), the RPS will set a smaller energy supply rate with a
larger α. Moreover, the costs of RPS in terms of load factor
ρ are illustrated in Fig. 10(c). At s = s∗, ν = 0.05 → 0.8
corresponds to ρ = 0.56 → 0.95. The figure shows the best
response of the RPS occurs at heavy traffic situations, e.g.,
ρ > 0.7. These results corroborate the intuition that a larger
supply rate will result in a larger supply cost for the RPS.
In Fig.11(a), we compare the system cost at the NE and
the optimal system cost (b = 10, cs = 5, ϕ = 1). In this
figure, we can see that the gap between such two values is
quite small with the backlogged cost factor α = 0.5. In order
to coordinate the system to achieve a minimum system cost,
based on the cost sharing, a kind of transfer payment contract
is proposed. In Fig.11(b) and Fig.11(c), we show the BS cost
and the RPS cost at the NE. For illustration purpose, we set
the cost sharing factor, ε, to be a medium value of the range.
The corresponding costs with such a contract coordination are
illustrated. Also, we show the reservation and backlogged costs
of the BS, and the supply and backlogged costs of the RPS in
the centralized optimal solution. Moreover, the gap between
the RB cost in the centralized optimal solution and the total
cost of the BS with coordination is the transfer payment in
the contract.
Fig. 12 shows the energy cost saving by using the re-
newable energy. We set µ0 = 2, α = 0.5. Clearly, using
the renewable energy not only achieves lower cost in most
cases, but also allows to avoid electric energy consumption.
In particular, if the connections arrival rate of the BS is 1.3
connections per second, then the saving of the total electric
energy which is mostly generated from the fossil fuel will be
1.3 · 24 · 60 · 1000 = 0.52 kWh in 1000 minutes. However, if
the connections’ arrival rate is larger than 1.6, i.e., the load
factor is 0.9, then, using the renewable energy is not efficient,
since the QoS reducing cost overcomes the cost benefit of the
green energy.
Next, the situations in which the BS powered by the
combination electric and renewable sources are investigated.
Different countries or provinces may have different energy
prices. In Fig. 13(a), we set λ¯ = 1.8, P1 = 1, µ0 = 2 and
α = 0.5. As the electric grid energy price P2 increases, the
BS will allocate a bigger fraction of its connections to be
served by the renewable energy source. For instance, with the
backlogged cost b = 5, if P2 = 5 → P2 = 10, to achieve
the minimum cost, the BS will set λ = 0.67 → λ = 1.11.
However, if the BS has a low QoS cost, i.e, b = 1, P2 = 5,
then λ = 1.05. This means that the BS can obtain more green
15
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
BS ID
Th
e 
re
ne
w
ab
le
 e
ne
rg
y 
su
pp
ly 
ra
te
 
 
Demand
Adaptive uniform allcoation
Social maximum allocation
(a) The energy supply rate demand and allocation.
1 2 3 4 5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
The renewable energy demand of BS
Th
e 
co
st
 o
f B
S
BS 8
BS 5
BS 4
Optimal demand
(b) Illustration of the dominant equilibrium.
16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30
80
90
100
110
120
130
140
150
160
The renewable energy production capacity µ0
To
ta
l c
os
t o
f a
ll B
Ss
 
 
Pareto mechanism
IC mechanism
Pareto mechanism
IC mechanism
b=5
b=2
(c) Comparison of the Pareto mechanism and the
IC mechanism.
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energy gain with low backlogged costs. In Fig. 13(b), we
compare the cost of the BS powered by the electric grid, and
the cost of the BS served by a combination energy. We observe
that, even as connections arrival rate λ¯ increases, using the
green energy still benefits the BS. This is because the adaptive
power management allocates a fraction of connections to be
served by the electric grid, not yielding a high QoS cost.
Consider the case in which λ¯ = 1.25 as a example. The
cost gain is about 4.5 with b = 5 in this case. As we stated
above, this cost accounts for 1000 minutes in term of cents.
Consequently, the cost saving for one BS is about 1.94 dollars
per month. Even though such a value is seemingly small, this
cost saving can be significant when a large number of BSs are
deployed. Also, the lower use of power from the electric grid
will reduce the overall CO2 footprint of wireless networks.
D. Analysis for the multiple BSs scenario
In Fig. 14(a), we examine the renewable energy supply
rate allocation with N = 8 BSs. We set µ0 = 20 which
represents that the maximum average energy output rate of
the RPS is 20. Let p = 2, P1 = 1, bi = 2, i ∈ N and
P2 = 10. λ¯i = 0.5i where i ∈ [1, 8] is the index of BS i.
Fig. 14(a) shows the BSs’ ordered energy supply rate and
the allocated rate by using the Pareto mechanism and the
Proposed adaptive uniform allocation. The figure illustrates
that the Pareto mechanism favors the BS with a large amount
demand. However, the uniform allocation favors the BS with a
small order, and the BSs 5, 6, 7 and 8 get a uniform allocation.
Corresponding to the scenario in Fig. 14(a), Fig. 14(b)
shows the cost of the BS when the reported demand varies.
Consider BSs 4, 5 and 8 as examples. We observe that as the
reported demand reduces, the cost of the BS cannot reduces
and may increases. And, when the reported demand is larger
than the optimal demand, the cost of a BS will maintain a
certain value. Thus, it is a dominant equilibrium for all BSs
to truthfully report their optimal energy demands under the
proposed adaptive uniform allocation mechanism. Moreover,
note that the mechanism requires at most 1 adjustment.
In Fig. 14(c), we show the total BSs’cost under the Pareto
mechanism and the IC mechanism. It is clear to see that the
adaptive uniformly allocation is not efficient. However, the
gap between the two mechanisms in terms of total BSs’cost
becomes smaller as the energy production capacity of the RPS,
µ0, increases. For instance, when b = 5, µ0 = 28, the IC
mechanism achieves almost the same system cost as the Pareto
mechanism, since the total demand of BSs is about 28 as well,
and both the two mechanisms will allocate all of the energy
capacity to BSs. Moreover, by choosing the IC mechanism,
the RPS can acquire truthful energy demand information from
the BSs. In practice, the RPS can use the informative IC
mechanism in some stages, yielding the RPS’s secure decision-
makings on capacity planning and sales planning. Also, it
can switch to the Pareto mechanism to make a larger social
welfare, and higher revenue.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have studied a wireless network in which
the BS is able to acquire power from renewable energy
sources. In the studied model, the BS can make reservations
for the renewable energy in order to support continuous
wireless connections. We have formulated the problem as a
noncooperative game between the BS and the RPS. In this
game, an M/M/1 make-to-stock queuing model has been used
to analyze the the competition between energy reservation
strategy and the energy supply rate setting. Several approaches
for improving the efficiency of the Nash equilibrium as well
as for better controlling the purchase of renewable energy
have been proposed. Then, we have extended the model to the
case in which multiple BSs operate with a monopolistic RPS.
For this case, we have proposed an allocation mechanism in
which BSs have an incentive to truthfully report their optimal
demands.
Simulation results have shown that using green energy pow-
ered BS yields a significant electric energy saving. Further-
more, our results also have revealed that a monopolistic RPS
can use the proposed informative IC mechanism to acquire
the market information in the multi-BS market, and can also
switch to the Pareto mechanism to achieve the optimal social
welfare. For the future work, how to develop mathematical
techniques to examine the impacts of dynamic prices on both
the green energy allocation and the Qos cost of wireless
networks will be very interesting and challenging.
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